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Abstract
Stochastic model checking has been the mainstay for formal analysis of epidemic progression in
recent years. However, such methods are sensitive to inaccuracies in estimating stochastic param-
eters like infection transmission and recovery rates. In this work, we revert to traditional model
checking (specifically, for timed automata) to absorb inaccurately provided parameters into the
non-determinism inherent in such traditional formalisms. Parameters obtained through stochastic
simulation are used by the timed automata, with sufficiently wide windows of non-determinism to
account for error. A positive side effect of this approach is that separating the probabilistic compo-
nent from actual epidemic timed automata model, helps us to focus on the progression logic while
building the model.
We demonstrate this approach using the model checker UPPAAL in conjunction with the stochastic
epidemic modeling and simulation tool GLEAM.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Mathematical modeling of epidemics helps in predicting the progression of an epidemic among pop-
ulations and across geographies. This in turn, helps in planning measures to control it. Epidemic
modeling has been studied extensively in the past. While the initial models were deterministic in
nature [1], recognition of the fact that epidemic propagation is inherently stochastic shifted the
focus to probabilistic models. Indeed, several epidemics have been modeled in this fashion in the
past. Initial stochastic models assumed homogeneous mix in the populations each individual in a
population is connected to every other individual in the same manner [2]. Therefore, an infected
individual can transmit the virus to any other individual with the same probability. However, it was
realized that this is not a very realistic model as individuals have limited contacts. Edge weighted
contact networks have since been used to capture neighborhood [3]. Modeling and simulation efforts
in these areas have yielded several interesting results as well as tools for studying the progression
of epidemics. While simulations are useful for studying simple properties of the progression of an
epidemic, more complex questions are difficult to answer. Moreover, a quantitative assurance of
accuracy in the results is desirable.
With these in mind, researchers turned to statistical model checking. Mathematically precise for-
malisms (like Continuous Timed Markov Chains (CTMC)) are used to model epidemic progression
among populations and queries regarding the model are framed in a suitable logic (like Probabilis-
tic Computational Tree Logic (PCTL), Probabilistic Timed Computation Tree Logic (PTCTL),
Continuous Stochastic Logic (CSL) etc). Following are some example queries of potential interest:
• What is the likelihood that at time t, at least c% of the population of a geographic region is
affected?
• What is the likelihood that at time t, the carrier who imports the disease for the first time to
a given geographic region arrives?
On the other hand, traditional model checking is done as follows. Given the description of a
system in a mathematically precise formalism and the requirements expected of it as a formula in
an appropriate (non probabilistic) system of logic, model checking algorithms attempt to verify if
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the described system satisfies the specified properties.
Among the two, statistical model checking gained traction in the field of epidemic analysis for
several reasons. To begin with, the problem is fundamentally stochastic in nature and thus amenable
to stochastic model checking. Secondly, this approach generally offers decent speed, if only at the
expense of accuracy. And last but not the least, statistical model checking offers scope for more
fine grained analysis. A statement like there is a 10% chance of the epidemic reaching a particular
geographic region in the next 50 days is more useful than a simple affirmation that it is possible for
the epidemic to reach in the next 50 days.
1.2 Motivation
We report an approach that combines traditional model checking with stochastic simulation meth-
ods. The motivations are following.
Firstly, this approach separates the stochastic element from the logic of epidemic progression
and simplifies the process of designing the model. We appeal to stochastic simulations only to get
an estimate of some of the delays required in the traditional model.
Secondly, it is often difficult to accurately establish various probabilistic parameters of an epi-
demic model. We compensate for the loss of accuracy by absorbing it into the non determinism
available in the modeling formalism. Suppose that through stochastic simulation, we have esti-
mates of the time t when r% of the population of a given geographic region gets infected by the
epidemic. Then, our approach centers on allowing for these events to occur at any time during a
window of time using non determinism for example, between t + δt and t − δt. The size of the
window of non determinism can be chosen based on ones confidence on the accuracy of the stochas-
tic simulation. Such a use of non determinism has been reported in the past in different contexts [4].
A final motivation is that there are differences in the expressiveness of various logic systems ne-
cessitating the framing of some queries in non probabilistic logic. Having traditional model checking
approaches as well in the repertoire plugs that gap.
Timed automata, defined by Alur and Dill [5], have proved to be very useful for modeling
and verification of timed systems. Together with formal specifications required of the system (in a
temporal logic) and algorithms for model checking, it provides a technique for analyzing temporal
behaviour of such systems. Model checking tools like UPPAAL [6, 7] have been developed and
widely used for the purpose [8, 9, 10, 11].
Our approach involves the temporal parameters like:
(i) Given that a certain geographic region is affected by the epidemic, how long does it take for the
infection to appear in another region?
(ii) How long does it take for the infection to assume epidemic proportions in a region, and
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(iii) How long does it take for a region to recover from the epidemic.
These parameters in turn depend on various socio-economic parameters like the connectivity be-
tween two regions, the strength of the healthcare system of the involved countries etc. For instance,
the more connected a given country is to an affected country, the faster the epidemic reaches there.
On the other hand, a strong healthcare system minimizes the duration for which a country remains
affected. However, it is difficult to translate these parameters into the temporal parameters that we
are looking for, for use in the timed automata model.
We get around this by leveraging the “Global Epidemic and Mobility model”, a tool that in-
tegrates real world data of the kind described above with stochastic models of epidemic propagation.
Following are some example queries as per our approach. Given that an infection starts in a
certain part of the world on day 0,
• Will a certain geographic region be necessarily infected between days 120 and 150? Choice
of venues for mass international events like sports meets in a certain interval of time, and
planning medical logistics.
• Is it guaranteed that there will be some date after day 200 when all geographic regions will be
free of the infection?
1.3 Organization of Thesis
Thesis is arranged as follows. The next section provides a brief discussion of existing work in the area.
Section 3.1 provides a brief introduction to Timed Automata, Tree Computation Tree Logic(TCTL),
UPPAAL and the GLEAMviz tool. Chapter 4 describes our approach and discusses example queries
and their results. Finally Chapter 5 concludes the work with discussion on challenges faced during
modeling epidemic propagation.
3
Chapter 2
Related Work
In this section, we briefly review some important recent work in the area of epidemic model check-
ing. As discussed in the previous section 1.1, most of the literature concerns with stochastic model
checking. Drabik and Scatena [12] model the progression of an epidemic in a homogeneous popu-
lation using the PRISM model checker and ask queries framed in PCTL. Sam Huang [13] strikes a
compromise between homogeneous population models and contact networks among individuals by
treating population that exhibit similar behavior as a node and establishing contact network between
these nodes. This model is encoded as a CTMC and the queries are framed in CSL. However, it
is not made clear how one obtains some crucial parameters, like the weights on the edges between
two meta-nodes. While this is not crucial for demonstrating the efficacy of vaccination strategies
(as was indeed the aim of this work), it is not clear how it models the progression of an epidemic in
the real world. Both approaches use the PRISM model checker for analysis and report experiments
for small scale scenarios.
Ciochetta and Hillston [14] report an approach on the Bio-PEPA process algebra. In this ap-
proach also, the population is divided into homogeneous sub populations and the progression of the
epidemic across various contact network topologies is investigated. For model checking, they derive
a PRISM model from the Bio-PEPA model and frame queries in PCTL. They report that for the
derived PRISM model, the verification of properties is not very efficient. In all the above mentioned
works, the reported experiments are small scale small populations divided among a small number
of patches.
In a seminal work, Bortolussi and Hillston [15] use fluid approximation techniques in reducing
the state space of the agent based CTMS for approximate model checking of epidemic propagation.
The approach is complex, as the limit model of an individual is a time inhomogeneous CTMC.
Complex networks and social networks provide a close imitation of interactions of individuals.
Therefore, as research in these areas matured, results therein have been increasingly applied in
understanding epidemic dynamics, cf. [16, 17, 18, 19, 20] and references therein. This also led to
advances in related problems like propagation of computer viruses across networks [21].
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Chapter 3
Preliminaries
3.1 Timed Automata
Following is a brief discussion about Timed Automata (TA). Please read [5] for a detailed treat-
ment. A timed automaton is essentially a finite state machine extended with clock variables. It
uses a dense time model where a clock variable evaluates to a real number and all clock variables
progress synchronously.
Definition 1: A Timed Automaton A is a tuple (Q,Σ, C,E, q0) where
• Q, a finite set of states of A,
• Σ, a finite set called the alphabet or actions of A,
• C, a finite set called the clocks of A,
• E ⊆ Q× Σ×B(C)× P (C)×Q, a set of edges, called transitions of A, where,
– B(C) is the set of boolean clock constraints involving clocks from C, and
– P (C) is the powerset of C
• a function Inv : I(C) that associates with each location a set of boolean constraints on the
clocks.
• q0, an element of Q, called the initial state.
Informally, the automaton can remain in a state only as long as it does not violate an invariant
condition associated with that state. On the other hand, it can jump to another state across an edge
if a guard condition associated with the edge is satisfied. These conditions are encoded in B(C).
On taking a jump, it is possible to reset a subset of clocks. Thus, an edge (l, σ, b, p, l′) represents a
transition from location l to l′ , where σ is an action symbol and b is the guard condition associated
with the edge, and p is the subset of clocks that need to be reset.
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Such automata can be constructed to model real time reactive systems. An extremely useful
fact is that it is possible to define parallel composition of timed automata. This facilitates writ-
ing timed automata models for complex systems as similar to modular approach in Software Industry.
Having constructed the timed automata model, one asks queries framed in a temporal logic
regarding the temporal behaviour of such an automata. Model checking algorithms are designed to
answer such queries. Some properties of interest are:
1. Reachability: If a specific condition holds in some state of the model.
2. Safety: If a specific condition holds in all states of an execution path.
3. Liveness: If a specific condition is guaranteed to hold eventually.
4. Deadlock: If there is a deadlock in the model.
Not surprisingly, safety and liveness are the most important properties. Fortunately, these have
been shown to be decidable in case of timed automata [5].
There exist a variety of tools for the analysis of timed automata and its extensions, including the
model checkers like UPPAAL [6, 7]. We are using UPPAAL for verification of our Timed automata
model. UPPAAL is useful for verifying desirable properties of systems that can be modeled as
networks of timed automata. Additionally, it implements integer variables, structured data types,
user defined functions, and channel synchronisation and urgency in states. The query language of
UPPAAL, that specifies the properties to be verified in the timed automata model, is a subset of
Timed Computation Tree Logic (TCTL).
This subset includes queries of the form:
• A <> φ: Always, φ will eventually hold true
• A [ ]φ: Invariantly, φ is true
• E <> φ: Eventually, φ will be true on some path
• E [ ]φ: Potentially, φ is always true
where φ := A.L | gd | gc | φ and φ | φ or φ | not φ | φ ⇒ φ | (φ) for automaton
A. Location L, data guard gd and clock guard gc. Clock guards are predicates involving clocks:
x ∗ c where ∗  {<,<=,==, >=, >} for clock variable x and natural number c. Data guards are
predicates over standard arithmetic expressions:E ∗ E where E is a standard arithmetic expression
∗  {<,<=,==, >=, >, ! =}. Finally, we also make use of the “bounded liveness” query provided
in UPPAAL: φ−− > (ϕ and x < c) which says that whenever φ is true, ϕ is true within c time units.
For the purpose of understanding Timed Automata modeling basics, Lamp-User [7] example is
demonstrated below. Example problem specification is like this:
There is a “User” and “Lamp”. “User” presses lamp button and “Lamp” has 3 locations viz.
Off, Low,Bright.
Given that Lamp is in Off state,
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Case-1: Single Click , on pressing the button once, Lamp should go to Low state.
Case-2: Double Click , on pressing the button twice quickly, Lamp should go to Bright state.
Here quickly means, User has to press twice within 3 time units.
Case-3: Double Click , on pressing the button twice lazily, Lamp should go to Off state.
So, two major entities are involved namely “User” and “Lamp”. “User” presses the lamp-button.
“Lamp” detects that button is being pressed by “User”. Depending on the applicable Case#,
“Lamp” changes its state. Two timed automaton are designed separately namely Lamp automaton
and User automaton, to capture the behavior of Lamp and User respectively. Whenever User presses
the button, a signal is sent to Lamp automaton (using press!) and Lamp take transition to next
state after listening to press signal (using press?). Here press is synchronisation channel/signal,
where
• press! denotes
press signal is sent to Lamp automaton, whenever this transition (Self loop labeled with press!
in User Automaton, Figure 3.1) is taken by User automaton.
• press? denotes
transition (transition/edge over which press? is labeled) is taken only on the receiving of press
signal from sender automaton in system.
and these two transitions (one which is sending signal and one which is receiving) occur simultane-
ously at the same time. Clock variable c takes care of the timing restriction. So Whenever User
presses the button, clock c gets reset and start ticking. If user presses quickly i.e. within less than
3 time units, guard condition (c < 3) allows Lamp automaton to go into Bright state. If user
presses lazily, i.e. User is taking more than 3 time units. In that case guard condition (c >= 3)
allows Lamp automaton to go into Off state. If Lamp is already in Bright state and User presses
the button once, on receiving press signal, Lamp automaton goes into Off state. Figure 3.1 and
3.2 shows Lamp-User system modeled as two separate automaton in UPPAAL tool. UPPAAL tool
itself does parallel composition of two automaton before doing model checking.
Figure 3.1: User Automaton Figure 3.2: Lamp Automaton
Model Checking
1. Is there any deadlock in system?
TCTL query: A [ ] not deadlock
Verdict: Satisfied.
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2. Is it the case that Lamp is in state Bright and clock value still higher than 3?
TCTL query: E <> lamp.Bright and c ≥ 3
Verdict: Not Satisfied.
Above mentioned queries verdicts ensure that system is deadlock free and it is never the case
that system is not following requirement specifications.
3.2 TCTL Model Checking
It is useful to know how model checking is performed by UPPAAL using TCTL queries. UPPAAL
takes the model (say M ) as input, which user designs as network of timed automaton. UPPAAL
takes TCTL query (which is actually property to be verified on model). UPPAAL converts TCTL
query into automaton (say P).
Implementation (Model M) meets specification P iff L(M) ⊆ P . Then Verification problem simply
reduced to checking emptiness of L(AM
⋂
L(AP )
c.
3.3 The Infection Model
In epidemiology, infections are often characterized using the compartmental model. At any given
point in time, each individual of the population is in one of several possible “compartments” -
susceptible, latent, infected and symptomatic, infected but not symptomatic, recovered etc. The
individual then transits from one compartment to another with time.
Figure 3.3: Compartmental Model of Infection: Edges labeled with transition rates
Together with interconnections between compartments, and the rates of inter-compartment tran-
sitions, one can characterize the infection. For example, an S-E-I-R-S model of infection makes an
individual cycle through being susceptible, exposed, infected, recovered and being susceptible again.
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To obtain values for the parameters to be used in the timed automata, we rely on the GLobal
Epidemic and Mobility Model (available publically as the GLEAMviz tool [22]), which models the
progression of an epidemic as a stochastic process. GLEAM takes as input this characterization of
the infection, together with other parameters like places where the infection originates, the fraction of
the population infected initially in these places, connectivity parameters like flight occupancy rates,
commute times etc. GLEAM uses real-world data for populations, human mobility, and health care
conditions in a locality, to enhance accuracy in prediction and analysis of the future course of an
epidemic outbreak. The interested reader is referred to [23] for details.
Indeed, GLEAM has been used to predict the progression of epidemic outbreaks like the 2002-3
SARS [24], the 2009 H1N1 [25] and more recently, the Ebola outbreak of 2014 [26].
3.4 About GLEAMviz
The GLEAMviz client is a desktop application by which users interact with the GLEAMviz tool. It
provides GUI for its four main functions:
1. the design of compartmental models that define the infection dynamics;
2. the configuration of the simulation parameters;
3. the visualization of the simulation results; and
4. the management of the users collection of simulations. i.e. user can see simulation results
oﬄine also.
3.4.1 Disease Model built using GLEAMviz
The Model Builder provides a graphical tool for designing compartmental model corresponding to in-
fection. Model Builder enables the user to define the compartment label (susceptible/latent/infectious.
etc), the mobility constraints applicable to each compartment (e.g. whether road, air commuting is
allowed/not allowed) and initial fraction of population in each compartment.
The disease model is depicted in Figure 3.3. We can see that in disease model, road and air
commuting is allowed in every compartment. There are only 4 compartments namely suscepti-
ble, exposed, infectious and recovered. Box labeled “infectious” between susceptible and exposed
compartments actually means that people in susceptible compartment come in contact with infec-
tious people with rate beta and become exposed. People in exposed compartment become infec-
tious with expected rate alpha. Likewise people in infectious compartment get recovered with rate
recover rate and again become susceptible after certain period of time with rate second cycle. This
inter-compartmental movement of people is observed for 365 days (default setting in GLEAMviz
tool), thus epidemic propagation behavior can be observed for 365 day duration.
3.4.2 GLEAMviz Visualization interface
Compartment model corresponding to infection is submitted to GLEAM server. Simulation runs on
server and output is sent back to client. Geographic map is displayed as a result of simulation. Map
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can be zoomed to see city/country locations. On clicking a particular city, it’s details get popped up,
namely population of city, number of beds/hospital per 10000 people, age distribution of population.
It allows to visualize propagation of epidemic from one place to another as people start commuting
from one geographic region to another. In between epidemic statistics at particular date can be
monitored like number of new cases reported on that day, total number of people infected till now,
The visualization interface is depicted in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4: GLEAMViz: Simulation Visualization Interface
10
Chapter 4
Our Approach
4.1 Modeling epidemic dynamics
We model geographical regions as vertices of a complete graph - that is, there exists an edge between
every pair of regions. This essentially means that every region is connected to every other region
through different means of transport.
One of these regions is designated as the originator of the epidemic. Corresponding to each
geographic region, we construct a timed automaton that models the temporal behaviour of the
epidemic in that region. We use a slightly different automaton for the geographic region where the
infection originates. The automata are shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2.
Table 4.1 provides a look-up for the variables used in the automata.
Term Meaning
id region identifier
t[id] clock associated with region c[id].
e:id t non deterministic selection of region id
c[id].d[e] delay at region c[id] before the first occurrence of infection is brought in from c[e]
infected[i] a boolean array that records whether a region i is affected by the epidemic or not
infectCount number of times region c[id] goes into the epidemic phase in a given period of time
c[id].rt time needed at c[id] to recover from the epidemic
c[id].st time after the first infection appears but before the region reaches its epidemic phase
Init(id) resets a region’s local parameters like t[id] and c[id].infected
SeenB[ ] an array for recording the regions from which epidemic
alerts have appeared during the current epidemic cycle
SeenItBefore[id][e] decides if an epidemic alert from region e has already been
considered in the current cycle (makes use of seenB[])
gt clock that keeps global time
Table 4.1: Notation
There are locations in each automaton that signify
• (i) when the region is unaffected by the epidemic (labeled by A, and a special addition one
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time starting location Safe for the originating region)
• (ii) the time elapse at the region before the first infection appears because of some other
region getting into its epidemic phase (labeled by B, D, F, H, J; detailed explanation later in
the section)
• (iii) the time elapse between the first appearance of the infection (carried in from abroad) in
the region and its reaching the epidemic stage (labeled by K) and
• (iv) the time taken for the region to recover from the epidemic (labeled by L).
We first describe a simplistic scenario for ease of exposition. The automaton for every region is
initially in its unaffected location A. The automaton of a region, say R1, leaves this location only if
some other region (say R2 ) gets into the epidemic phase. The movement out of the unaffected loca-
tion is triggered by “alerts” from R2 in the form of synchronization and shared variables provided in
UPPAAL. Even after R2 gets into the epidemic phase, it takes some time for the infection to reach R1
through a carrier. This delay, say d21, depends primarily on the connectivity from region R2 to R1
1.
Moreover, let us assume an inaccuracy of δ in the stochastic estimation of d21 through GLEAMviz
stochastic tool. Then, the automaton for R1 waits nondeterministically in location B for a delay
between d21− δ and d21 time units. After this delay, the first incidence of the infection in R1 occurs
due to its connectivity with R2 . It takes st time units (Spread Time) for R1 to enter into epidemic
phase. Assuming the error of δ′ time units, the automaton waits nondeterministically in location K
for a delay between st− δ′ and st units. On completion of this delay, it transits to location L. This
location signifies the full blown epidemic. On non deterministically completing between rt (Time to
Recover) and (a conservative) rt+ δ′′ time units in the “epidemic” L phase, the automaton returns
to the unaffected location A if all other regions are uninfected. Otherwise, the infection cycle starts
all over again for the region. As before, δ′′ is the error that we anticipate in the stochastic simulation.
The delays st and rt for a region to recover depends on the strength of its healthcare system.
Parameters like the number of hospital beds per 10000 people are good indicators of this strength.
This simplistic scenario can get complicated when another region (say R3 ) with which R1 has
better connectivity gets into its epidemic phase while R1 is still waiting for the infection to be
brought in from R2 . Let the delay of getting the infection from R2 be d31. Further, let t1 be the
time at which region R1 becomes susceptible on account of R2 getting into its epidemic phase. Let
the first infection carrier come to R1 from R2 at t1 + d21. Suppose at t such that t1 ≤ t ≤ t1 + d21
, R3 enters into its epidemic phase. If t1 + d21 − t ≥ d31, a infection carrier from R3 will arrive at
R1 earlier than one from R2 , and the automaton changes location to reflect this. Otherwise, the
automaton maintains status quo and waits for d21 units for the carrier from R2. Note that multiple
regions can enter into their epidemic locations at different points in time, potentially modifying the
time of first arrival of a infection carrier. Locations B,D,F,H and J capture thisone, two, three,
four and five regions getting into their respective epidemic location. These parameters dij , st and
rt have been determined using data collected from GLEAMviz [22], an epidemic modeling tool in
section 4.2.
1While the connectivity in terms of air, road or sea transport from R2 to R1 is expected to be the same in the
opposite direction, we do not assume this.
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4.2 Determining parameters using GLEAMviz
It remains to determine values of various parameters in the timed automata. As mentioned earlier,
we use the GLEAM model and simulator for this purpose. We choose an SEIRS infection model
with parameters as shown in Table 4.3. The simulation is run for a period of 365 days.
To obtain the delays dij , we choose i as the originating region and measure the delay before
an infection appears first in region j. Doing this for all pairs in both the directions, we obtain the
“Delay” columns of Table 4.2. The “spread time” is defined as the number of days elapsed between
the first appearance of the infection in a region and 1% of the population getting infected. This is
when the region enters the epidemic phase. Similarly, the “recovery time” is the number of days
elapsed between entering the epidemic phase and the first day when no new infection appears 2.
These times are recorded; see columns labeled “Spread time” and “Recovery time” in Table 4.2.
Continent Delay dij Spread time Recovery time
Asia 2 18 4 23 8 8 40 167
Africa 10 2 6 22 18 20 65 175
Europe 6 6 2 6 4 23 57 170
South America 27 21 10 2 8 24 76 169
North America 8 18 4 2 2 8 60 174
Australia 8 20 21 32 15 2 61 172
Table 4.2: Parameters of the system
In this discussion, we choose geographic regions at the granularity of continents for brevity of
explanation. Thus, the world is divided into the six major continents. GLEAMviz allows a choice
of finer granularity as well, namely subcontinental regions etc. For each continent, we identify some
important, well connected cities as the origin of the infections. These values serve as parameters to
the timed automata implemented in UPPAAL. In the timed automata, we choose Asia as the region
where the infection originates in the first place.
4.3 Queries and Results
The queries posed and the results obtained upon checking them against the model in Uppaal are
depicted in Table 4.4. Table 4.4 shows some example queries and their answers. Queries 1 and 2
concern all the regions in different intervals of time, while 3 and 4 concern a specific region. For
example, query number 1 asks whether at any time between day 300 and day 400 all the regions are
necessarily affected by the epidemic. Similarly, query number 3 asks whether region 3 is necessarily
affected between day 200 and day 300. For these queries, we have taken δ = 4 and δ′ = δ′′ = 1. A
change in these values would change verdicts accordingly.
2These definitions can be changed as required.
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Continent Originating cities
Asia Beijing, Shanghai, Tokyo,
Seoul, Mumbai
Africa Lagos, Cairo, Johannesberg,
Nairobi
Europe London, Paris, Madrid, Rome,
Berlin, Istanbul
South America Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro,
Buenos Aires, Lima
North America New York, Los Angeles,
Chicago, Mexico City, Toronto
Australia Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane
Comapartment transition rates (SEIRS)
Susceptible-Latent 0.835, 0.417
Due to Infectious and Asymtomatic
Infectious respectively
LatentInfectious and Symptomatic 2/3.3
LatentInfectious but Asymptomatic 1/3.3
Infected and SymptomaticRecovered 0.6
Infected but AsymptomaticRecovered 0.6
RecoveredSymptomatic 0.0001
Miscellaneous
Start Date 18/12/2014
Flight Occupancy Rate 90%
Time Spent at commuting destination 8 hrs
Fraction of population infected at origin (Mumbai) 0.00042
Table 4.3: GLEAM Parameters
S. No. TCTL Query Verdict
1
A<> ( gt >= 300 and gt <= 400 and infected[0] == 1 and
infected[1] == 1 and infected[2] == 1 and infected[3] == 1 and
infected[4] == 1 and infected[5] == 1)
N
2
A<> ( gt >= 200 and infected[0] == 0 and infected[1] == 0
and infected[2] == 0 and infected[3] == 0 and infected[4] == 0
and infected[5] == 0)
N
3 A<> ( gt >=200 and gt <= 300 and infected[3] == 1 ) Y
4 A<> ( gt >= 120 and gt <= 150 and infected[3] == 0 ) Y
Table 4.4: Example Queries
14
F
ig
u
re
4
.1
:
T
im
ed
A
u
to
m
a
ta
fo
r
fi
rs
t
In
fe
ct
ed
re
g
io
n
15
F
ig
u
re
4
.2
:
T
im
ed
A
u
to
m
a
ta
fo
r
a
ll
o
th
er
re
g
io
n
s
16
Chapter 5
Conclusion
Current model is designed with 6 continents into consideration. This number can be scaled to large
number of locations as per requirement of problem definition. But checking large location timed
automata model may lead to state space explosion and verifying such model is really problematic
as large memory and more time is needed to verify properties. Sometimes it is observed that some
queries never terminate. This is one major problem in scaling the model to more number of geo-
graphic regions because TCTL model checking is exhaustive by nature.
One may overcome this state space explosion problem by cleverly reusing variables, number of
clocks, synchronisation channels and every data structure construct that is mutable. Best is to
reduce their number as much as possible. But doing so is not possible always.
In our epidemic model, we have kept number of geographic regions minimum due to this very
reason. But at the same time, to maintain generality of model and practical enough to mimic real
epidemic propagation , we choose 4 to 5 number of major cities in every continent.
The underlying concepts and modeling formulations of timed automata can be applied to other
network models, viz. social networks, computer networks (to study spread of viruses), and so on
and so forth.
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